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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies to what extent engaging a management consultant firm during 
the innovation process may increase the likelihood of success. Firms often fail to 
benefit financially from their innovations, and this paper seeks to investigate if the 
probability for financial success will increase by using a consulting firm. By 
looking at a case between a Norwegian pharmaceutical company, Nycomed, and 
the American firm McKinsey, the thesis looks into how the consultancy changed 
Nycomed into a world leader in contrast media. The research is based on i) written 
reports and documents from both firms, preserved at the Norwegian National 
Archive, and ii) interviews with three former employees of both firms. The thesis 
discovers that the use of McKinsey certainly contributed to Nycomed’s success 
with their most important product Omnipaque.  
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 Chapter 1: Research Subject 
1.1. Research subject 
In the article “Nations, Clusters and Culture: Nycomed and World Leadership in 
the Field of X-ray Contrast Media” by Knut Sogner, we learn about one of the 
largest success stories from Norwegian industrial research.1 Nyegaard & Co, a 
pharmaceutical research firm, developed a contrast media product known as 
Omnipaque which was one of the world’s ten to fifteen best-selling drugs on the 
world market.1 Contrast media are liquids used inside the body to enhance X-ray 
photographs. From being a small company in 1975 with about 750 employees and 
zero profit, the company became one of the world’s largest producers of contrast 
media with over 1200 employees.3 Sogner rises the question as to how a small 
Norwegian company could be such an international success. Sogner argues that 
Michael Porter’s theory about the competitive advantage of nations was too 
limited to explain the success of Nycomed. The cluster part of Porter’s theory, 
however, made sense when put in the context of trans-national clusters. Nycomed 
collaborated with Scandinavian radiologists as well as Sterling Drug and Schering 
AG, two large contrast media companies. The three companies collaborated in 
speeding up the development of Omnipaque in order to beat the other 
competitor’s effort towards market launch.  
 
Sogner also argues that the success of Nycomed was due to its internal culture.  
Nycomed had strong traditions in conducting research, a strategy they transferred 
to contrast media. Nycomed sent chemists to England for doctoral studies, and the 
family-run company clearly had scientific ambitions. Sogner argues that the 
employees were “a group of people with doctorates, professorships and 
professorship competency leading both research and the company”. The strong 
emphasis on research and science was thus a strong factor contributing to the 
success of the development of Omnipaque.  
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
1Sogner, Knut. 1993. 
2Now referred to as Nycomed. The company changed its name from Nyegaard & Co to Nycomed 
in 1986. 
3Based on numbers from Sogner 1993. 
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The article establishes an understanding of why Nycomed succeeded with their 
development of groundbreaking contrast media products. They were first-to-
market with the leading product Amipaque. The launch of Omnipaque will be 
further explained through chapter 4.  
 
But having an excellent product and launching it first does not necessarily mean 
that a company will reap the majority of economic success. The problem with an 
innovation is that the innovator might not be the “winner” after the product is 
commercialized. Nycomed managed to profit significantly from their innovation 
Omnipaque and the contrast media division of the company financed the two 
other divisions. In 1992 Nycomed obtained about a third of the worldwide 
revenues from Omnipaque: 2.4 billion Norwegian kroner. Omnipaque had about 
45% of the world market of about 2 billion US dollars.4 This thesis will 
investigate how Nycomed was able to become a world leader in contrast media. In 
1982 Nycomed hired the American management-consulting firm McKinsey & 
Company to investigate the potential market for Omnipaque.5 Nycomed was a 
small Norwegian company, and the author wishes to see how the company 
changed, and was able to benefit significantly from their innovation. It would be 
interesting to look into whether or not the services provided by McKinsey 
provided the right strategic direction for Nycomed, and to what extent their 
collaboration contributed to the success of Omnipaque. The author hopes this 
thesis will shed some light on the ability to succeed with innovation when using 
external consultants.  
 1.2. Hypothesis  
Hypotheses: Nycomed’s success in the field of contrast media is linked to 
services, and strategies developed for them by the consultancy firm McKinsey. 
Their services laid the foundation towards the goal to become a world leader in 
the field of contrast media. 
1.3. Research Question 
Research question: Did McKinsey’s consulting services contribute directly to the 
success of Nycomed’s innovation “Omnipaque”? 
-------------------------------------- 
4Sogner, Knut. 1993 
5McKinsey & Company will from now on be referred to only as McKinsey. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
In this thesis I will try to investigate how the innovation “Omnipaque” became a 
successful product, and especially a financial success for Nycomed. To 
understand how companies may increase their probability for success this chapter 
will look into theory about profiting from innovation. 
 
What is innovation? An innovation is more than simply a good idea, or an 
invention. While an invention is the first occurrence of an idea for something new, 
an innovation is an attempt to carry it out in practice. A firm has to be able to turn 
their ideas into innovations, and to hopefully prosper on them. Joseph 
Schumpeter2 defined innovation broadly. Schumpeter listed five different 
concepts of innovations: product innovation, process innovation, market 
innovation, environmental innovation, and organizational innovation. In this 
thesis we will see Nycomed go through nearly all of them.  
 
Innovations are often characterized as being either incremental or radical. An 
incremental innovation is a small change to something that already exists such as 
e.g. Coca Cola introducing “Coke Zero,” which basically is the same as a regular 
“Diet Coke”. A radical innovation is something that changes the way we think or 
do business, such as the mobile phone. Fagerberg1 argues that firms may need to 
take wider social and economic implications of their innovation into account. The 
case of Nycomed and McKinsey will show that radical innovations, such as 
Omnipaque, may require extensive infrastructural investments and organizational 
change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
1Fagerberg, Jan. 2005 
2Schumpeter, Joseph. 1934 
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2.1. The Innovation Process 
The innovation process is a process characterized as contingent. The process may 
differ with regard to sectors, type of innovation, geography, and for example 
corporate strategy. The process may also vary with respect to the size and 
traditions of a firm. The process of innovation is contingent, and is embedded in 
both social and cultural structures of any given firm. A specific innovation 
process may be developed internally in a company, such as in 3M or Procter & 
Gamble, or rise organically as in the case of Silicon Valley and its Venture 
Capital. According to Pavitt there is no widely accepted theory of firm-level 
processes of innovation that integrates all dimensions of a firm. Pavitt suggest the 
following framework for understanding the innovation process:3 
 
“1. Innovation processes involve the exploration and exploitation of opportunities 
for new or improved products, processes or services, based either on an advance 
in technical practice (“know-how”), or a change in market demand, or a 
combination of the two (…). 
2. Innovation is inherently uncertain, given the impossibility of predicting 
accurately the cost and performance of a new artifact, and the reaction of users to 
it.  It therefore inevitably involves processes of learning through either 
experimentation or improved understanding (…).” [Italics added].  
 
With regard to the innovation developed by Nycomed, it seems applicable to use 
the term exploration of an opportunity. It was the scientist Torsten Almén, along 
with Hugo Holtermann and his team who developed the chemical substances for 
their first non-ionic contrast media named Amipaque, and later Omnipaque. The 
products were at the time radical innovations, meaning something completely new 
to the market. There were other contrast media available, but none who held the 
same unique properties. More about this development will be explained later. 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
3Pavitt 2005   
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Freeman and Soete4 believed that innovations could be classified based on how 
radical they were in relation to the current technology. If an innovation was only a 
continuous improvement to the existing technology, it was to be considered 
“incremental”. If it were something totally new, like for example new machinery, 
it would then be considered radical. This paper is dealing with a radical 
innovation.  
 
The innovation process comes, as explained, in various forms. One generic 
example that can be used for understanding Nycomed’s position is the following 
model: 
  
Fig. 1: “Chain-linked model” developed by Kline, S.J., and Rosenberg, N.5 
 
An invention or idea is something anyone can have, but in order for it to become 
an innovation, it has to be carried out in practice. It has to be commercialized. To 
be able to turn an invention into an innovation, a firm normally needs a variety of 
skills, knowledge and resources. In this case the author has observed a high level 
of scientific skill, based on the interviews discussed later. 
-------------------------------------- 
4Freeman and Soete. 1997.  
5Kline, S.J., and Rosenberg, N. 1986 
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Nycomed had a strong tradition of scientific research and development. As 
mentioned earlier they had been successful with their first non-ionic contrast 
media Amipaque, and were now facing the challenge of internationally 
commercializing the new substance iohexol, used to develop the product known 
as Omnipaque. Amipaque was a unique but expensive product which faced zero 
competition. It was, however, not a product that could be used in the entire body 
such as Omnipaque.  
 
In order to succeed with commercialization it is not enough to only have a product 
that customers will be interested in. Companies have to take the right market 
approach, use efficient channels for marketing and distribution, and for a 
relatively small Norwegian company this was a new challenge.  
 
One of the problems with commercialization is related to who will actually benefit 
from the innovation. The typical case is that of Xerox PARC and Apple Inc. 
Xerox developed both the GUI (graphic user interface) and the mouse, but failed 
to see the value of what they had.6 Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple, visited the company 
and bought their technology, which is basically the same as in all computers 
today. Xerox failed to exploit the commercial potential of their innovations, 
primarily because they did not seem to hold the same value as the photocopier 
business.7  
2.2. Profiting from Innovation 
David J. Teece (1986) tries to explain why innovating firms sometimes/or often 
fail to benefit significantly from an innovation.6 Teece argues that customers, 
imitators, and other industry participants benefit more often than the innovator. 
Although a company is first-to-market with a new product, Teece argues that they 
often fail to reap the financial benefits. Teece has created a theoretical framework 
for understanding why this happens, as well as how companies can organize 
strategically in order to maximize their innovation output. Teece’s paper seeks to 
determine who “wins” from an innovation: The firm first to the market, followers, 
or firms possessing relevant capabilities for market success.  
-------------------------------------- 
6Teece, David J. 1986 
7Rogers. 1995 
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Teece used three fundamental building blocks for understanding the distribution 
of outcomes from innovation: the appropriability regime, complementary assets, 
and the dominant design paradigm.8 
 
The appropriability regime 
The regime of appropriability refers to factors that govern an innovator’s ability to 
capture the profits generated by innovation. Teece believes that the most 
important factors for such a regime are:  
- The nature of the technology 
- The efficacy of legal mechanisms for protection 
 
Teece recognized the following as the key dimensions of appropriability: 
For legal instruments patents, copyrights, and trade secrets are most important. 
For the nature of technology the product itself, the process, tacit information, and 
codified knowledge are most important. Patents are one of the most important 
types of legal protection of intellectual property. Teece argues that patents seldom 
work in practice, and that they rarely confer perfect appropriability. Patents can of 
course confer some protection, but they are often inexpensive to “invent around”. 
Patents are also especially ineffective with regard to protecting process 
innovations. In the case of Omnipaque it was patented long before market launch. 
By patenting the chemical formula Nycomed became protected from competitors 
copying their formula. Nycomed faced competition from most of the larger 
contrast media firms, which naturally worked on their own substances to capture a 
share of a rapidly growing market.  
 
Tacit knowledge is another dimension of appropriability, which can create sound 
protection from imitators. Codified knowledge is easier to transcribe and transmit, 
and is thus exposed more easily in cases of e.g. industrial espionage. Tacit 
knowledge by its very nature (being intangible) is difficult to articulate and thus 
hard to transfer. 
 
  
-------------------------------------- 
8Teece, David J. 1986 
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Nycomed certainly seemed to be ahead of their competitors with respect to the 
work conducted by Torsten Almén and Hugo Holtermann. They developed the 
first non-ionic contrast media Amipaque, and from the interviews conducted for 
this thesis the author was made aware by several of the subjects that those two 
should hold credit for their work. It seems that the employees at Nycomed held a 
high standard in the scientific work they were conducting. Nycomed was an 
organization focusing on science, and thus it seems that they possessed 
information and skills characterized as formal.  
 
Teece divides the appropriability regime into “weak” and “tight”9, in which tight 
refers to a technology that is relatively easy to protect. In the case of Nycomed it 
seems that the company was protecting their innovations well with patents. They 
relied on formal research and development, and held high standards without there 
being any specific tacit properties involved. The appropriability regime is to the 
author thus characterized as fairly tight. 
 
The dominant design paradigm 
Teece distinguishes between what he describes as “two stages in the evolutionary 
development of a given branch or science”: the pre-paradigmatic stage and the 
paradigmatic stage. The former describes the situation where no single generally 
accepted conceptual treatment of a phenomenon exists within a field of study. The 
latter describes the situation where a body of theories appears to pass the canons 
of scientific acceptability9. In the pre-paradigmatic stage industrial development is 
fluid, processes adaptively organized and competition manifests itself amongst 
designs, which are markedly different. In the paradigmatic stage, after some time, 
one design has become the standard. Abernathy and Utterback10 hypothesized that 
competition amongst products changes with the emergence of a dominant design. 
Teece argues further that once such a design emerges, competition shifts from 
design towards price. Competitive success shifts from one set of variables to 
another.  
 
-------------------------------------- 
9Teece, David J. 1986 
10Abernathy and Utterback. 1978 
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When Nycomed started experimenting with contrast agents one may say that they 
entered the pre-paradigmatic stage. Nycomed focused on science and was an 
informal, fluid, and small Norwegian firm. Amipaque, their first non-ionic 
contrast media, was a radical innovation which laid the foundation for the more 
dominant design Omnipaque. Sogner argues that Amipaque not only transformed 
Nycomed, but also the conception of contrast media and the world market for 
such products. By engaging McKinsey they turned their focus from science to 
market, and they got a better idea of the actual economic possibility that lay in 
Omnipaque. Because Omnipaque sold as one of the top 10-15 drugs worldwide 
(1992) the author finds it reasonable to classify it as a dominant design. Nycomed 
had an advantage with Omnipaque, and as a small company they were aware of a 
potential but not the magnitude. McKinsey wanted to change the company culture, 
and turn the focus on contrast media. When a dominant design emerges, the 
market turns from design towards price orientation. One of the reasons why 
Nycomed was able to succeed was their change of focus.  
Complementary assets 
In almost all cases, Teece argues,  
 
“The successful commercialization of an innovation requires that the know-how in 
question be utilized in conjunction with other capabilities and assets”[italics 
added]. Teece, David J. 198611 
 
Complementary assets are those such as marketing, sales, production, support, and 
so forth. Teece recognizes that the commercialization of a new drug, as in the case 
of this thesis, is likely to require the use of specialized information channels. In 
the analysis I will also look into the licensing of sales, and how employing agents 
for marketing and sales may affect the likelihood of successful commercialization. 
Teece divides complementary assets into generic, specialized, and co-specialized 
assets, depending on the generic, unilateral, and bilateral dependence between the 
innovator and the asset.  
 
-------------------------------------- 
11Teece, David J. 1986 
12Sogner, Knut. 1993 
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The greater the innovator depends on the asset, the larger the risk and potential 
pitfall if opportunistic behavior emerges. In a global competitive market it is 
unlikely to believe that an organization would integrate all of its dimensions. 
Teece argues that no company could keep pace in all of the areas by itself, and 
that complete integration is unnecessary and expensive.  
 
Implications for profitability 
The Profiting from Innovation framework explains how managerial choices, 
intellectual property protection, and decision-making may influence a company’s 
opportunity to benefit from innovation.13 It is a theory applicable for competitive 
strategy. In tight appropriability regimes Teece argues that companies with 
ironclad protection are “almost assured” of capturing market value. In weak 
regimes, however, the innovator must turn to business strategy in order to keep 
imitators at bay, and maximize their revenues. Nycomed had to turn to business 
strategy in order to orientate the company towards the contrast media market, and 
in order to exploit the financial potential of the innovation Omnipaque. They had 
to change the mentality of the employees, developing a big-win culture quite 
contradictory to the common Norwegian mindset of not believing in oneself. 
 
In the pre-paradigmatic stage innovators should be careful of how they design 
their products. It seems essential, based on Teece’s argumentation, that the 
innovator should wait until an industry standard is set before letting design 
“float”. In this case Nycomed set the industry standard. Once a paradigmatic 
design has emerged production volumes start to increase, and opportunities for 
economics of scale emerge. Thus in such a situation the use of specialized assets 
is likely to increase. Price becomes increasingly important and Teece argues that 
the access to complementary assets becomes critical.  
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
13Teece, David J. 1986 
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Figure 8. From: Teece, David J. 1986.14 
The figure shows how businesses can organize what to internalize or subcontract.  
Larger firms tend to have the various assets already internalized and ready for 
introducing new products, and smaller firms will more often have to turn to the 
market because of the expenses of integration. In Teece’s own reflections about 
the Profiting from Innovation paper, he argues that the taxonomy developed 
around complementary assets and technologies was the most important 
contribution of the paper.14 Morton found that in generic pharmaceuticals the 
proclivity to enter new markets was greater where there were similarities in 
manufacturing, distribution, and marketing.15 
 
Complementary assets are thus one of the keys for understanding how Nycomed 
turned from a small Norwegian company into a world leader in contrasts. 
McKinsey was a critical asset for Nycomed during the commercialization of 
Omnipaque, and a specialized asset in strategy and managerial consulting. 
Nycomed was too small to conduct proper market research, strategy evaluations 
and used McKinsey to assist them in changing the corporate culture as well. 
Mansfield and Wagner also argue that having proper market research before the 
launch of an innovation improves the likelihood of success.16 
-------------------------------------- 
14Teece, David J. 2006 
15Morton, Scott. 1999.  
16Mansfield, Edwin and Wagner, Emanuel. 1975 
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A more thorough analysis of the relationship between Nycomed and McKinsey 
will be presented in Chapter 4 and 5. Complementary assets can shape how an 
industry works, and for the drug industry they certainly can shape the magnitude 
of success when e.g. launching a new drug. The Profiting from Innovation 
framework indicates that the boundaries of the firm are an important strategic 
variable for innovating firms, and that ownership of complementary assets helps 
establish who benefits from innovation.  
Profiting from Innovation and Strategy 
”Strategy is the deliberate search for a plan of action that will develop a 
business’s competitive advantage and compound it. For any company, the search 
is an iterative process that begins with a recognition of where you are and what 
you have now – the differences between you and your competitors are the basis of 
your advantage”[italics added]. Henderson B. 17 
 
PFI is a strategy paper because it frames how companies can make important 
strategic decisions by taking the business environment, protection of property 
rights by patents or tacit knowledge, and the positioning in complementary assets 
into account. It is a good framework for analyzing what Nycomed went through 
during the innovation process for Omnipaque. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
17Henderson, B. 1991 
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2.3. Michael E. Porter 
In his book Michael E. Porter develops a framework for understanding the 
competitive forces of any given industry in which a company exists.18 The 
comprehensive framework utilizes analytical techniques to help firms analyze its 
industry, the industry’s evolution, understand the competitors, and to use this to 
form a competitive strategy. Porter’s framework analyzes five competitive forces 
influencing an industry, and their implications. The framework is important to 
better understand how McKinsey analyzed Nycomed, and the results of their 
strategic actions.  
Porter’s structural analysis of industries 
Porter argues that industrial structure has a strong influence in determining the 
competitive rules of “the game” as well as potential strategies for a firm.18 Porter 
believes that competition in an industry depends on five forces, which collectively 
determine the profit potential. The five forces can be displayed as the following 
model:  
 
Figure 1-1. “Forces Driving Industry Competition” - from Porter 2004.19 
-------------------------------------- 
18Porter, Michael E. 2004. Originally published in 1980. 
19Porter, Michael E. 2004. p. 04 
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The goal of competitive strategy is to find a position where a company can best 
defend itself against the five competitive forces. Porter argues that although the 
collective strength of these forces may be apparent, the key for developing a 
competitive strategy is to delve below the surface and analyze the sources of 
each.20 The understanding of each force provides valuable information about a 
company’s relative strengths and weaknesses. It may also create an understanding 
of how to position the company, as well as highlight industrial trends and strategic 
opportunities. Porter’s framework enables companies to interpret reality. The 
model creates an understanding of barriers of entry, treatment of substitutes, what 
kind of suppliers a company depends on, industrial rivalry, and so forth. For the 
pharmaceutical company Nycomed, one of the key forces will be 
suppliers/licensees in distribution. I will get back to this in the analysis chapter. 
The framework established by Porter is good for understanding how McKinsey 
analyzed and worked with Nycomed, and Porter’s thoughts about the five forces 
are also relevant for understanding how Nycomed succeeded with licensees, 
important assets for the commercialization of Omnipaque.  
 
In the article by Sogner described in Chapter 1, he analyzes the success of 
Nycomed based on Porter’s theory about National Clusters.21 Sogner highlights 
that one of the reasons for Nycomed’s success was due to what he describes as a 
“trans-national cluster”. Nycomed collaborated with Sterling Drug and Schering 
AG during the development of Omnipaque. Sogner argues that tight collaboration 
and Scandinavian conditions led to a competitive advantage for Nycomed, which 
had a close relationship with Scandinavian radiologists. 
 
There are thus many factors influencing Nycomed. On the one hand is scientific 
success in creating a breakthrough product, and on the other financial success 
changing the whole company. In Chapter 4 the story of Nycomed’s success is 
presented. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
20Porter, Michael E. 2004 
21Sogner, Knut. 1993.  
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Chapter 3: Method 
3.1. Case Study 
This case study is conducted with the intent to study and explore the particular, 
and single case in which Nycomed and McKinsey interacted. In this chapter I will 
examine the general case study, and the methods applied to this thesis.  
 
Case studies have different meanings for different people in various contexts. 
Robert E. Stake1 defines a case study as “The study of the particularity and 
complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important 
circumstances”. Stake emphasizes that case studies are not limited to qualitative 
inquiry, but also applicable in quantitative research2. For the purpose of this thesis 
I will however use qualitative methods further explained below.  
Yin3 further explains that the case study is the relevant research method when the 
questions asked are “how and why questions”. The case studied in this thesis is 
very much related to questions like this, explained above. 
 
There are three different approaches to case studies explained in Stake’s book. 
The first is intrinsic, where a case is studied for the intrinsic interest in the case 
itself. The second is instrumental, which is chosen to explore a research question 
in order to gain insight and understanding of something else. The final type of 
study is the collective, in which multiple cases are analyzed for a collective 
understanding of a research issue. 
 
This thesis is seeking to investigate what happened in the interaction between 
Nycomed and McKinsey and could be considered an intrinsic case study. The 
thesis is also exploring consulting companies and their effect on clients, and could 
thus be considered instrumental as well. The author wishes, as described in the 
first chapter, to investigate not only if the relationship was successful, but also 
how it evolved, what it derived from, and how it came to an end.  
 
-------------------------------------- 
1Stake 1995, p. xi 
2Simons 2009, p. 1 
3Yin 2009, p. 27 
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3.2. Design 
This study is built using a single case design. Yin4 has given five rationales that 
justify the use of such a design. For this paper the following rationale made the 
author choose the single case design. One can argue that the case is an extreme 
case, or unique. Nycomed was in a particularly interesting situation, in that they 
had a breakthrough product but were unaware of the potential it held. There are 
not many Norwegian companies that have had such huge breakthrough products 
and who have had such a success. The possibility to investigate a case between a 
management consulting firm and their client is also very difficult. In this case, 
however, which occurred thirty years ago, it is now possible to get people to talk 
about it, and to find documents containing information from that specific time. 
The author acknowledges the possibility of such a relationship taking place in 
other organizations, but the ability to investigate it is in this case unique.  
3.3. Interviews 
The term interview is related to parties engaged in asking and answering 
questions5. Regardless of the design of an interview, the general sequence of 
interaction is question-answer. There are, however, great differences in how 
interviews are designed, and this is naturally related to what the interviewer seeks 
to discover. Questions are usually structured either as closed, or open. The intent 
of this thesis is not only to discover to what extent McKinsey contributed to 
Nycomed’s success, but also what lay behind the decision to buy consultant 
services, and also how the relationship between the two companies functioned. 
The interviews in this thesis are conducted between the researcher and the 
individual face-to-face. The intent of these interviews was not to create a simple 
question-answer interaction. Closed questions seldom lead to deep insights. 
Open questions have broader parameters and invite the interviewed subject to 
elaborate on a broad or specific topic. It allows the subject to formulate his or her 
own answer on topics presented by the interviewer.  
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
4Stake 1995, pp 3-4 
5Roulston 2010, pp 10-11. 
Master Thesis GRA 19002  30.08.2011 
Page 17 
Elaborate descriptions of topics also allow the interviewer to investigate new 
topics that might come up during the conversation. Follow-up questions, or 
“probes” allow for deeper investigation6.  During the interviews in this study the 
author used a general interview guide, but focused on conversing with the subjects 
and allowing them to tell their story. The guide was designed to keep the 
conversation going but was not needed to any noticeable extent.  The interviews 
were conducted at the subject’s address.  
 
There are limitations with regards to the interviews. The case under investigation 
took place over thirty years ago, and some of the interviewed subjects may have 
forgotten facts and details. There may also be some bias connected to the fact that 
Odd K. Strandlie worked his entire life at Nycomed, and that Gert W. Munthe 
worked for both Nycomed and McKinsey. They may thus favor their own 
organizations and project then overly positive. During the interviews the author 
however felt that Gert W. Munthe and Stein Holst Annexstad were able to be 
more critical about decisions made by themselves and the management in 
Nycomed. They are both critical to the strategic direction the company took after 
Hafslund bought it. The author will also overcome some of these limitations by 
studying the McKinsey reports to confirm that what is found in the interview data 
correlates with the views of that time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
6Roulston 2010. P. 12 
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3.4. Samples 
In the case between Nycomed and McKinsey three subjects have been selected for 
interviewing. 
 
The first subject is Odd Kåre Strandli. Strandli started in Nycomed back in the 
1950’s as a chemical engineer. He got his education from NTH8 in Trondheim, 
and had previously held an intership at Nycomed. He became fascinated with their 
interest in research, and started working for Nycomed in 1963. Strandli worked 
his way up in the organization, and became the director of the contrast media 
division after Norgas bought Nycomed. Today Odd Kåre Strandli is retired. 
 
The second subject is Gert Wilhelm Munthe. Munthe holds a degree in social 
economics (ex. oecon) from the University of Oslo, as well as an MBA and a 
MIA (Master of International Affairs) from Columbia University in New York. 
Munthe was affiliated with McKinsey during their work with Nycomed. He was 
recruited for business development, and later as managing director of Nycomed 
Imaging. Today Gert Munthe runs an investment company, Hercules Capital, 
which invest in and develop companies in Norway.  
 
The third subject is Stein Holst Annexstad. Annexstad has a “Siviløkonom”9 
degree from NHH10 in Bergen. Annexstad was working as director for a 
Norwegian industrial conglomerate company named Dyno Industrier AS when he 
was recruited to come work for Nycomed. He started working at Nycomed after 
the company was bought by Norgas, and remained there until 1991. Today he 
works for his own firm Holstein AS, as well as serving as chairman of the board 
for the Norwegian bio-chemical firm Algeta AS.  
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
8NTH is short for Norges Tekniske Høgskole, which later changed its name to Norges Teknisk-
Naturvitenskaplige Universitet, or NTNU.  
9The degree “Siviløkonom” is the equivalent of an MSc in Business and Administration 
10NHH is short for The Norwegian School of Business and Administration. 
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3.5. Document analysis  
The most important sample for the thesis is the documents and reports from the 
specific case, stored in the Norwegian National Archive. Nycomed has preserved 
reports, letters, and miscellaneous documents at the state archive. The documents 
contain information vital to the case study. In the archive there are reports from 
McKinsey, correspondence between management, as well as miscellaneous 
documents from their interaction. The main documents of interest are the reports 
that may show how McKinsey viewed Nycomed before and after their work, the 
strategic options they developed for Nycomed, and what challenges they faced.  
3.6. Reliability and Limitations 
Time is one of the factors that may have inflected the reliability of the thesis. The 
case presented in the following chapter took place between 1981 and 1990, and 
thus happened over twenty years ago. The interview subjects may have forgotten 
events that could be important to the thesis. The author feels, however, that the 
validity of the interviews correlates well with the findings in the archived reports. 
Another liability might be the subject’s strong connection with their success. They 
might fail to see things they did wrong, and might hide facts to protect 
themselves. The author feels, however, that by interviewing three subjects with 
different backgrounds, that opportunistic behavior is limited.  
 
 
The author acknowledges that the thesis is limited by its very nature: being a case 
study. The case is, however, a good one, with a radical new innovation and a 
company facing the challenges of internationalization. Nycomed is a perfect case 
to examine in order to investigate the potential effects of hiring consultants during 
the innovation process. Largely because of the large amounts of data in the 
National Archives, access to former employees in top management, as well as 
prior research about Nycomed.11 The author recognizes the need for a larger data 
sample to be able to generalize completely about consulting and its contribution to 
innovation. The thesis is also limited by its size and timeframe.  
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
11Sogner, Knut. 1993 and Amdam, Sogner. 1994 
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Chapter 4: The case of Nycomed & McKinsey 
3.1. Introduction of Nycomed 
Nycomed’s history does not start with the production of contrast media. The 
pharmaceutical division of the company was established in the early 1900’s in 
Norway, and they had for many years engaged heavily in research. The company 
was researching within many different fields. During one of Odd K. Strandli’s 
first visits during the 1950’s he recalls:1 
 
“I opened a drawer and there I found shoe-polish” – Odd Kåre Strandli2 
 
Nycomed developed their first contrast media as early as 1934, registered as 
“Urotrast”3. Companies like Sterling Drug and Schering AG had, however, 
already developed new and better products within this field. Nycomed wanted to 
get a foot in the developing contrast media business and developed “Isopaque” in 
1959.4  
 
Nycomed started investing in research within this field, but it was not until 
Torstein Almén became involved that they discovered what would ultimately 
become the future of the company: “Amipaque”5. Amipaque was the first ever 
non-ionic contrast media. The product was less harmful to patients, and also held 
superior attributes from the ionic competitor agents. Contrast agents are injected 
into the blood stream of the patients, so called vascular examinations, and the 
older products were known to cause side effects like pain, burning sensations and 
even death. Torstein Almén had become increasingly interested in this during 
1962-63, and was approached by Nycomed’s Hugo Holtermann after 
circumstantial events that prevented them from cooperating. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
1Odd Kåre Strandli was a chemical engineer at Nycomed, who later became director of the 
contrast media division. 
2Interview with Odd Kåre Strandli 10.11.11 
3GE Health. 2010 and Amdam, Sogner. 1994, pp 120-121. 
4Amdam, Sogner. 1994, pp 121-122.  
5Amdam, Sogner. 1994, pp 152-155.  
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Almén’s ideas were so new and “radical” that even his coworkers had trouble 
believing it was possible to create a non-ionic agent, but in 1969 they had found 
the solution that became known as Amipaque. The final product was released in 
1974.  
 
Nycomed established contracts for licensing their products to the global market. 
In Scandinavia they had their own operations with regard to sales and marketing. 
Outside, however, they held tight relationships with Schering AG in Europe, and 
Sterling Drug in the United States. In 1979 nearly 60% of Nycomed’s income 
came from their exports6.  The relationship with Sterling Drug was of great 
importance, not just with regard to the vast American market, but also with regard 
to collaboration in research as well as production and technical development.   
 
Amipaque was an expensive product to produce, and was normally used only in 
the spinal canal. Isopaque and its competitors were still being used for vascular 
examinations, and Nycomed thus wanted to further develop a non-ionic contrast 
media for this purpose.   
 
By the end of 1978 they had produced a substance named 545, which later was 
developed and named iohexol. Iohexol would be the foundation for the 
development of “Omnipaque” which would turn out to be the largest success for 
the company. By 1980 the product was ready for testing on human subjects, and 
in 1982 it was approved in Norway and major parts of Europe7. This was the 
beginning for one of the ten best selling drugs in the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
6Amdam, Sogner. 1994, pp, 190-191. 
7Amdam, Sogner. 1994, pp, 199-209 
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3.2. Nycomed Pre-McKinsey 
Nycomed had been run by the Blix family since before the 1950’s, and was thus a 
family business. Odd K. Strandli explains that the Blix family was satisfied as 
long as Nycomed made money for the family, as they owned practically 100% of 
the company.8 They had a genuine interest in science, research and development, 
but as the time came to find their successors they realized that their children 
would not be able to bring the company forward. Strandli explains that the Blix 
family started to realize the potential in the products after the launch of Amipaque 
around 1974, and that their family might limit the possibilities of Nycomed.  
 
“They were honest enough towards themselves to see that none in their next 
generation could take the firm further” – Odd Kåre Strandli8 
 
Towards the end of the 1970’s they started looking at alternative buyers amongst 
the larger Norwegian firms. They approached companies such as Hydro, Hafslund 
and Glaxo, but none of them seemed interested, and Glaxo seemed to view 
Nycomed as a possible production facility in Scandinavia rather than a research 
facility, which was the view and ideology of the Blix family. Ulf Blix was 
searching for buyers, and found one at his neighboring cottage, which was owned 
by Kåre Moe, director of Norgas. After what Strandli described as “discussions 
over the fence”, the result was that Norgas bought Nycomed.8 
 
The merger was the result of a desire to reorganize as a conglomerate, but it also 
had certain tax benefits. This implied a much larger organization, but also a new 
view on how the company should be organized. Norgas had divisions in shipping 
and welding, and were interested in acquiring a chemical/pharmaceutical firm 
such as Nycomed. The establishment of a large conglomerate was the main 
interest of Kåre Moe, a leading businessman during the 1980’s in Norway. 
Nycomed had been a family driven organization, but Kåre Moe had a different 
perception on how companies should be organized, and Nycomed was 
transformed into a company of distinct divisions.  
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
8Personal Interview with Odd Kåre Strandli 10.01.2011 
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3.3. Nycomed seeks external advice 
Kåre Moe had a more modern approach to how businesses were run, and he was 
also willing to take more risk.9 Nycomed had been organized primarily as a family 
business, where the owners where happy as long as they made money.10 The Blix 
family had taken careful steps in business, focusing on science and research, but 
Moe quickly realized that there was unreleased potential within the company. 
 
Kåre Moe had the mindset of how to run a company with respect to the stock 
market. He had interest in maximizing profits and organizational efficiency, with 
regard to shareholder value.  Blix was suspicious about selling with regard to 
research traditions, and the annual spending of 15% on R&D was something that 
he “demanded” be sealed in a written agreement with Kåre Moe. At this time 
Nycomed was earning in the hundred millions, and 15% at this time was indeed a 
lot of money. 
 
When the company developed Omnipaque and it became available on the market 
in 1982, Kåre Moe decided to buy services from McKinsey, which at that time 
was located in Copenhagen, Denmark. His interest was to acquire knowledge 
about the potential for Nycomed, and Omnipaque.9 Nycomed was at the time only 
present in some markets but Moe had visions about there being global potential 
for Nycomed’s contrast division. In order to expand it became clear that Nycomed 
would have to upgrade its entire production facility, to meet potentially new 
capacity demands as well as FDA standards.11 
 
Norgas had good experiences from using McKinsey’s services, and Gert Munthe 
believed that they also were called in to examine what Norgas had actually 
bought.12 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
9Personal Interview with Odd Kåre Strandli 10.01.2011 
10The Blix family had almost all the shares in Nycomed according to Odd K. Strandli and Gert W. 
Munthe.  
11FDA is an acronym for Food & Drug Administration, an American public health regulator. 
12Personal Interview with Gert Wilhelm Munthe 13.01.2011 
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3.4. Introduction of McKinsey & Company 
James O. McKinsey founded McKinsey in 1926. The firm established a practice 
in budgeting and finance, but James O. McKinsey wanted to use “management 
engineers” to help poorly performing companies to do better. He established a 
vision  “To help clients make distinctive, lasting, and substantial improvements in 
their performance and to build a great firm that is able to attract, develop, excite, 
and retain exceptional people”.13 
 
Management engineers in this era were largely companies working on improving 
efficiency by applying Taylor’s techniques. Frederick Taylor believed that 
analyzing components of e.g. a product or product line and applying incentive 
systems for that specific worker/engineer could increase productivity and 
eliminate opportunistic behavior among industrial workers. Taylor was recognized 
as the pioneer of “task management”.14 James O. McKinsey believed that 
consultants could not only help “sick” companies with efficiency issues, but also 
help healthy companies reorient, restructure and thrive in a turbulent business 
environment.  
 
In 1933 Marvin Bower joined McKinsey. Bower would further advocate for 
management consulting as a profession, and following the early death of James O. 
McKinsey he would shape the company into how it is today. Bower compared 
management consulting to law and medicine, and believed that consultants should 
perform at the same high standards. By the 1930’s the term “management 
consulting” started to replace “management engineering”, and Marvin Bower was 
later credited by the Harvard Business School as the “father of management 
consulting”.15  
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
13McKinsey & Company 2011. A history of McKinsey: 1920’s 
14McKenna. 2006, p 35 
15Harvard Business School. 2011. Marvin Bower. 
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McKinsey grew rapidly in the 1940’s and McKenna believes this was the result of 
their localization near the largest American corporations, and because the firm 
worked only for chief executives.16 By the early 50’s they had offices in many of 
the largest cities in the U.S. and were expanding into Europe.  
 
The world economy became more integrated following the Second World War 
and McKinsey established their first overseas office in London in 1959. 
According to McKenna, McKinsey decided to open an office in London after 
committing to install the multidivisional organization for Royal Dutch Shell Oil in 
their London/Hague headquarters.17 By 1966 the London office had become the 
second largest, and by the end of the century half of their revenues would come 
from overseas activities.  
 
Because of European firms increasing demand for the American multidivisional 
form the company became a verb, rather than a name. Being “McKinseyed” 
became synonymous with a complete restructuring of a corporation.18 McKinsey 
was hence becoming the recognized brand in management consulting. McKinsey 
had become the leading form for rapid transfer of American know-how in the 60’s 
and 70’s, but they could only install the multidivisional model in so many firms. 
McKinsey shifted their emphasis to strategic planning, profitability studies, 
merger advice, and in the 80’s and 90’s they invested heavily in studies of 
corporate culture, especially from Japan. The trend of “new products” in 
management consulting established itself with Arthur Andersen & Company and 
BCG dominating the fields of IT consulting and corporate strategy.18 
 
Journalist Sandra Salmans explained in the New York Times: 
 “In the 1960’s, decentralization was the vogue in management. In the 1970’s, 
corporate strategy became the buzzword (…) [italics added].19 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
16McKenna. 2006, p 169. 
17McKenna. 2006, pp. 173-186 
18BCG is short for The Boston Consulting Group 
19McKenna. 2006, p. 212 
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McKinsey was specifically brought into Nycomed in order to revise their 
corporate strategy, and prepare the company for international competition and so 
forth. After their first engagement McKinsey would also look into the corporate 
culture at Nycomed in order to ensure that the implementation of their work 
would be successful. McKinsey would use their 7S diagnostic tool for corporate 
culture and Porter’s Five Forces when analyzing Nycomed.  
 
3.5. Mckinsey’s view on Nycomed 
The consultants from McKinsey were a group of Americans except for Gert W. 
Munthe and the Indian project leader Rajat Gupta. Karl Ahrendt, was the project 
manager from McKinsey and held the overall responsibility for the success of the 
project, but it was Gupta who took the operational decisions. Nycomed was at the 
time organized into three separate divisions: contrast media, pharmaceuticals, and 
diagnostics. Nycomed had made their own estimates of how large the potential 
market for contrast media was, soon to be revealed as being too low. McKinsey 
had a larger apparatus for conducting such analyses, as well as a worldwide 
approach and experience. Odd K. Strandli recalled the quality to be better, and 
that the market estimates were thoroughly conducted with interviews at e.g. 
Schering and Sterling, the two biggest licensees for Omnipaque.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -------------------------------------- 
20Personal Interview with Odd Kåre Strandli 10.01.2011 
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3.5.1 Phase one: Project Escalation 
The Memorandum of proposal in 1983 outlines the background for McKinsey’s 
engagement in Nycomed.21 Nycomed is described as an extraordinary but small 
Norwegian firm, and a leader in the market for myelographic x-ray contrast media 
(contrast media used in the spinal canal). The company had been very profitable 
in the latter years. 
 
” (...) Nycomed’s sales have grown at a compound annual rate of 22%, and pre-
tax earnings have grown at 47% a year.” McKinsey & Company21 
 
The report states that although the company is showing signs of success, the 
management at Nycomed thinks the time has come to re-examine the company’s 
overall strategic direction. Specifically, Nycomed was interested in investigating 
additional product/market opportunities in each of its three major business units 
and in identifying the business system, organizational, and financial resources, 
which would need to be executed for a revised strategy vision through the 1980’s 
and beyond. Nycomed had increasingly become dependent on its contrast 
business, and McKinsey believed that the company was moving from a “me too” 
position towards a leader in the contrast field. It would thus be necessary to revise 
the corporate vision and identify new separate strategies for the three divisions. 
The project was named “Project Escalation”.  
 
Objective: “Simply stated, the overall purpose of the project will be to help 
Nyco’s management select a strategic roadmap for achieving sales growth and 
return objectives through the 1980’s and beyond.21 
Sub-objectives: 
1. To identify the principal realistic opportunities and strategy alternatives 
available to each of Nyco’s business units and to evaluate them in 
sufficient depth so as to enable management to make an informed choice 
among them. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
21Memorandum of Proposal September 1983. Archive Di – 0037 
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2. To refine the company’s overall strategic framework based upon the sum 
of each of the individual business unit strategies and then to develop a 
consensus around the new corporate `vision´. This refined corporate vision 
will provide the base for the development of an overall `game plan´ for 
resource allocation, organization strengthening, and implementation 
efforts.”- McKinsey & Company, Memorandum of proposal. 198322 
 
The contrast division had been profitable for a long time and shown impressive 
growth. Nycomed had acquired a good position in the market and held a brand 
recognized for their research. McKinsey, however, felt that their presence in the 
global market was too weak. The following questions needed an answer.  What 
strategic market-focused moves were required for Nyco to capitalize on its full 
potential in the world marketplace? Should Nyco devote major resources to assist 
current downstream licensees to capture additional world shares? Should Nyco 
shift its primary marketing focus to creating a stronger internal and daughter 
company marketing presence? Should Nyco seek to acquire a European or U.S.-
based marketing company/organization? McKinsey considered the possibility of 
Nycomed establishing a Nycomed Inc in the United States to compete with 
Sterling Drug.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
22Memorandum of Proposal September 1983. Archive Di - 0037 
23Personal Interview with Odd Kåre Strandli 10.01.2011 
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3.5.2 Conclusions from the Memorandum of Proposal 
From the steering committee presentation presented in the end of 198324 
McKinsey made the following conclusion: Nycomed’s contrast division had 
become the predominant contributor to the company’s overall profit during the 
recent years. McKinsey assumed that profits generated by the contrast division 
would count for 90% of the profits for the remainder of the decade. In 1975 
contrast media stood for 10% of the profits, but by 1983 the percentage had risen 
to 60%. The market developments for contrast media were at the time developing 
into a highly competitive global arena, a situation Nycomed would face for the 
first time. In recent years Amipaque had held almost a monopoly within its 
respective field, but in the coming era Omnipaque would need strategic direction 
in order to obtain maximum market penetration.  
 
McKinsey utilized the Porter’s five-forces analysis to analyze the current 
environment.24 The model was developed by Michael E. Porter and is described in 
the Theory chapter.25 
 
Industry rivalry: Nycomed’s product is seemingly the best product on the current 
market. Other competitors have similar products on the market but they have not 
the same qualities as Omnipaque. Nycomed also holds a strong position with 
regard to brand and quality awareness created by Amipaque. 
 
Nature of demand: Contrast media products are considered sold on a value-based 
form. Consumers demand the product based on quality and its properties. 
Omnipaque was by McKinsey in 1983 considered not to have any comparable 
substitutes. 
 
Market position of customers: Customers were described as a group of specialists, 
widely dispersed globally.  
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
24Steering committee presentation, December 22, 1983. Di – 0037 
25Porter, Michael E. 2004 
Master Thesis GRA 19002  30.08.2011 
Page 30 
Barriers to entry: McKinsey acknowledged the patent protecting the substance 
iohexol, as well as developing economies of production, which could enable 
Nycomed to outperform its competitors by price. This would require significant 
upgrades in production facilities. 
 
Market position of suppliers: Barriers for success were supposedly the possibility 
of production limitations amongst suppliers, as well as price determination. 
3.5.3 McKinsey 1984 Final Report 
From the final McKinsey 1984 report it is possible to divide their work into 3 
phases:26 
• Phase 1a 
o Diagnostic situation analysis 
• Phase 1b 
o Identify strategic actions and alternatives 
• Phase 2 
o Decide on alternatives and refine corporate vision 
• Phase 3 
o Implementation planning 
3.5.3.1 Diagnostic situation analysis 
McKinsey did a classic analysis of the market, analyzing things like the number of 
x-ray machines, the number of machines being used with contrast agents, number 
of patients with disease x or y, and so forth. While Nycomed aimed straight ahead 
McKinsey had larger predictions of the commercialization of Omnipaque. They 
aimed at the ceiling. While executives at Nycomed believed that the world market 
was the size of about seven or eight hundred million NOK, McKinsey closed in 
on an estimate of about ten billion NOK. 27 Gert W. Munthe says that the first 
thing McKinsey did was to try to communicate the potential that lay within the 
market for contrast media.28 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
26McKinsey Final Report Vol.1 1984. Di - 0039 
27NOK is short for the Norwegian currency kroner 
28Personal Interview with Gert Wilhelm Munthe 13.01.2011 
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There was naturally argumenting between McKinsey and Nycomed, but Strandli 
maintains that there was largely consensus between those engaged in the project. 
It was Nycomed’s top management that needed convincing. For the leaders of 
Nycomed the numbers were mind-boggling, but nonetheless a more adequate 
estimate.  
 
McKinsey started drawing a larger picture of the possibilities. The potential that 
lay in the revenues also generated other business potential in form of acquisitions, 
which will be discussed in the chapter “Continued relations”.  
 
The potential was in contrast media, and McKinsey tried to convince the 
organization to put most its effort into the contrast division. Nycomed had, 
however, always focused on diversification of research and were reluctant to 
abandon the other divisions. It became apparent, however, that the contrast media 
division was funding the other parts of Nycomed’s operations and McKinsey said, 
“This is what you know”. They wanted Nycomed to concentrate on contrast 
media, and look into the possibility of restructuring the other divisions.  
 
In the Final Report Vol.1 McKinsey started to draw a strategic overview of 
Nycomed.29 Nycomed was entering a new competitive era, and had to make hard 
strategic decisions in order to become the market leader in contrast media. 
Nycomed was facing poor opportunities in the pharmaceutical division, and 
McKinsey wanted them to change their pharmaceutical operations to try to 
become the leading drug distribution company in Scandinavia. This would require 
a complete restructuring of the division. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
29McKinsey Final Report Vol.1 1984. Di - 0039 
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Division analysis summary 
The contrast media division was facing an explosive growth at about 40% per year 
through the 1980’s and 1990’s. There were major opportunities in developing 
markets, as well as within new emerging imaging technologies.30 Nycomed would 
have to assume that other companies also would fight for their piece of the 
market. The profit margins were extraordinary at about 35-70%. McKinsey 
characterized the divisions by either a weak, parity, or strong market position. The 
contrast division was seen upon as being at a “parity” state, with the potential of 
becoming strong. Nycomed had acquired a lot of trust worldwide with its former 
product, Amipaque. In Sweden, Odd K. Strandli said that the use of products 
other than Amipaque was considered unethical by the Swedish drug 
administration.31 McKinsey felt, however, that the division lacked the ability to 
leverage their position, and that there were substantial possibilities for acquiring 
market shares.  
 
The Diagnostics division was facing great challenges during the end of the 
1980’s. The market for diagnostic products like enzymatic kits and control sera 
was mature with moderate to good profitability. McKinsey felt that control sera 
faced a depressive strategic outlook, with poor margins. The coagulation part of 
the diagnostics division was in a stable growing market, expected to undergo 
strong growth in Scandinavia due to new applications over the coming 5 years. 
The coagulation diagnostics were showing excellent profitability in niche world 
markets. McKinsey felt that key factors for succeeding within this area required 
an increase in quality and quality control as well as more marketing muscle. 
Nycomed’s position was, however, quite weak. They held a limited presence in 
Scandinavia, and their current strengths were in an unattractive controls business. 
Their products also required upgrading. This division was thus heavily 
challenged. 
 
The Pharmaceutical division was in most trouble according to the report. A 
mature market characterized the industry, with modest profitability, many 
competitors, and Nycomed in a weak position. 
-------------------------------------- 
30McKinsey Final Report Vol.1 1984. Di - 0039 
31Personal Interview with Odd Kåre Strandli 10.01.2011 
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The division was not profitable, it was vulnerable, and held no competitive 
advantage. McKinsey had major concerns and questions about the sustainability 
of this division. In order to turn the division around McKinsey felt that it would 
need restructuring. Nycomed would have to hire new marketing and sales 
expertise as well as try scale and volume penetration in the Scandinavian market.  
 
McKinsey conclusion:32  
On the basis of their strategy work, McKinsey concluded that the contrast media 
business represented the major core business for the near- and medium-term 
future. As such, it should receive highest priority investment for growth over the 
next decade. While attractive and requiring considerable resources, the 
coagulation business is less clearly a core thrust at this time. Nyco’s 
pharmaceutical business faces a substantial turnaround effort in order to develop a 
sustainable competitive position in the Scandinavian distribution arena.  
 
3.5.3.2 Strategic opportunities 
The findings from the 1984 McKinsey reports implicated that Nycomed would 
have to make significant changes to how they ran each of their divisions. 
McKinsey also outlined strategic choices they wanted Nycomed to make. 
 
Strategic Options for Contrasts 
Nycomed faced worldwide competitive challenges for the first time, and the 
market for Omnipaque was growing faster than expected. In McKinsey’s final 
report they forecast that the 1990 market would be as high as 17 billion NOK33. In 
addition to the rapid growth ionic contrast media was becoming substituted by 
non-ionics faster than they first anticipated.32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
32McKinsey Final Report Vol.1 1984. Di – 0039, McKinsey Final Report Vol.2 1984. Di – 0039 
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McKinsey suggested that Nycomed should take the following strategic actions in 
the coming decade:33 
1. Aggressively invest and grow to solidify contrast media as the core 
business. 
2. Nycomed should put major emphasis in investments, maintenance, basic 
R&D, and clinical trials to expand their product line in contrast media.  
3. They wanted Nycomed to increase their production capacity but also 
maintain flexibility. 
4. They wanted to develop a new “big win” mentality or corporate culture in 
terms of marketing and sales. In order to succeed McKinsey felt that 
Nycomed should aggressively manage their subsidiaries, develop an 
external focus towards the global market, consider one or more 
acquisitions, and most importantly: Review all contracts, further explained 
in the chapter “Nycomed Responds”  
 
Gert W. Munthe said that the challenge was convincing the employees at 
Nycomed that they could do this. After McKinsey had presented their final report 
in 1984, with the market estimates, he recalled one of the men from Nycomed 
saying: “Why become big when you’re happy as small”.34  
Strategic options for Diagnostics 
Nycomed would have to strengthen their competitive position for Enzymatic kits 
and controls. Controls would either have to be turnaround or withdrawn from the 
market. The coagulation part of the division should invest to strengthen their 
position in Scandinavia and Japan. McKinsey saw a possibility for the division to 
grow coagulation into a core business. They proposed three strategic actions. 1. 
Build new scientific knowledge, 2. Consolidate their franchises in the extended 
home markets and Japan, and 3. Expand geographically on an opportunistic basis. 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
33McKinsey Final Report Vol.1 1984. Di – 0039, McKinsey Final Report Vol.2 1984. Di – 0039 
34Personal Interview with Gert Wilhelm Munthe 13.01.2011 
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Strategic options for Pharmaceuticals 
The pharmaceutical business would have to be turned around. McKinsey wanted 
Nycomed to try to gain market leadership in Scandinavia. The business system 
needed to be redesigned to improve their current weak position. McKinsey 
developed the following strategic actions for Nycomed:  
A redesign of the overall business system for the division, with reallocation of 
research funds, research focus, and refocus on clinical efforts. They also wanted 
the division to focus on reducing production costs, as well as gain scale. The 
division would have to establish a marketing and sales intelligence function, build 
their own marketing department, and refocus their sales efforts.35 
 
Additional business 
In addition to the portfolio of current business, McKinsey recommended strategic 
opportunities in the radiological catheters (contrast division), non-isotopic 
immunoassays (diagnostics/reagents division), and cancer care arena (diagnostics 
and pharmaceuticals).  
 
The market for radiological catheters was large and rapidly growing. McKinsey 
viewed this market as attractive for Nycomed due to high margins, excellent 
competitor opportunities, and Nycomed’s success in marketing a United Kingdom 
catheter line with excellent results. Catheters are used to inject contrast media into 
the blood stream and would thus fit with Nycomed’s new focus. 
 
The non-isotopic immunoassays were a high potential pre-emergent business of 
which Nycomed already had basic scientific knowledge. For cancer care 
McKinsey saw a rapidly growing worldwide market, already quite large. There 
were good competitive opportunities, and McKinsey believed Nycomed could get 
a strong position here due to their excellent scientific reputation. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
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3.5.4 New Vision 
Based on the strategic thrusts McKinsey developed elements of a potential new 
Nyco vision – including fundamental changes in strategic arenas, competitive 
role, sources of competitive advantage, and organizational capabilities. 
A model of “Nycomed New Vision Development” from McKinsey’s Final report, 
Volume 2:36 
                                    Implicit old vision           Suggested new vision 
Strategic arenas - High quality products 
- Norway 
- High potential 
diagnostic/therapeutic 
- R&D ventures in 
Scandinavia – Global 
Competitive role - Niche research house 
- Norwegian 
licensor/licensee 
- Integrated market segment 
leader – world 
- Towering distribution 
leader – Scandinavia 
Sources of sustainable 
competitive advantage 
- Narrow technical 
innovation 
- Brand franchises 
- Sustained investments in 
broad span of technical 
innovation 
- Downstream marketing 
strengths 
Actions required N/A - Rapidly build research 
capability/joint 
ventures/licensees 
- Expand clinical skills 
- Consolidate distribution 
businesses 
- Acquire key 
products/companies 
- Develop 
management/corporate 
center 
Organizational capability - Centralized 
- Risk averse 
- Technical 
- Decentralized 
- Entrepreneurial 
- General management 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
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3.6 Nycomed responds 
The reports from McKinsey implied that the firm had to focus their investments in 
the contrast agent division. Nycomed was already pouring about 10-15% of their 
surplus into research each year. They also had to invest large sums for upgrading 
the production facilities in order to meet the coming demand. McKinsey assumed 
that iohexol would have a 33% penetration by 199037, and thus would Nycomed 
have to invest about one hundred million Norwegian kroner to be ready for the 
coming demand. 
 
Another key point McKinsey focused on was distribution. Nycomed had their 
own offices in Scandinavia, Eastern Europe, and Benelux. They were reliant on 
pharmaceutical firms to distribute their contrast agents in Western Europe and 
USA. The potential McKinsey saw in Omnipaque implied that Nycomed had to 
thoroughly evaluate their license contracts with the distributors. It was the 
American company Sterling Drug who handled Omnipaque in the Americas as 
well as in Japan through Daiichi. In Western Europe it was the German 
pharmaceutical firm named Schering who had the license for Omnipaque. The 
normal royalty for any drug was around 7-8%.38 McKinsey wanted Nycomed to 
try to increase their license fees with the two licensees. Neither of them would 
initially be willing to change them. Gert W. Munthe explains that they viewed the 
potential as so great that McKinsey initially suggested that Nycomed founded a 
“Nycomed Inc.” to distribute Omnipaque in the Americas.39 Together, however, 
they decided to prepare for discussions with Sterling Drug, something they spent 
the final years of the 1980’s on.38 Sterling had such a good market position, and 
reaching up to their level would require significant time and money.  
 
Nycomed wanted to increase their royalty options on future products and get 
support for further research. Odd K. Strandli called it “a fight”.38 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
37McKinsey Final Report Vol.2 1984. Di – 0039 
38Personal Interview with Odd Kåre Strandli 10.01.2011 
39Personal Interview with Gert Wilhelm Munthe 13.01.2011 
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The potential earnings for Omnipaque in USA were about $500 million. Sterling 
recognized the potential that lay in the current and future products, and was thus 
willing to start negotiations with Nycomed. While Nycomed was negotiating with 
Sterling, McKinsey was working “back office” alongside a Nycomed employee. 
They had stationed one of their employees at McKinsey’s office in New York. 
The reason for this arrangement was so whenever any point of the deal would be 
renegotiated, the employee and McKinsey could do calculations on what this 
meant for Nycomed. Odd K. Strandli recalls that whenever new terms were 
prospected they often had to take short breaks to communicate with the McKinsey 
office44. After a thorough series of negotiations Nycomed ended up with a royalty 
increase from a 7% to 12% average. Sterling got options on new products and a 
research collaboration were Sterling financed a part of Nycomed’s research. 
Negotiations had been successful. This is perhaps the most significant strategic 
move that Nycomed made.40 
 
McKinsey had developed an acquisition strategy for Nycomed during the late 
1980’s, and it said “Buy Sterling within 1994”. By October 1994 Nycomed 
bought Sterling Drug.  
 
With Schering however, the case was different. Schering had the rights to market 
Omnipaque in Western Europe, a product that competed with their own contrast 
media product. Schering made less effort, after developing a competing product, 
to market and sell Omnipaque and although their relationship remained 
professional, it was not to be considered “good”.41 They would rather market their 
own products, which led Nycomed to develop competing products to Omnipaque 
which they distributed themselves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
40Personal Interview with Odd Kåre Strandli 10.01.2011 
41Personal Interview with Stein Holst Annexstad 24.05.2011 
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3.7 Phase two: Building an excellent company 
The relationship between Nycomed and McKinsey started out in 1983 and 
prolonged into the 1990’s. The first project, which began in 1983 and ended in 
1987, was to Odd K. Strandli and Stein H. Annexstad the most significant.42 
Project Escalation would turn Nycomed into a global leader in contrast media. 
After successfully implementing the new vision developed by McKinsey, 
Nycomed’s Omnipaque would become one of the most selling drugs worldwide. 
It was the 1983-87 relationship that caused the most fundamental changes within 
the company, but the relationship with McKinsey would prolong in various forms 
into the 1990’s.43  
 
After McKinsey had finished “Project Escalation” they wanted to make sure that 
their strategic directions were thoroughly implemented in Nycomed, and initiated 
a second phase. Nycomed had for many years, as mentioned, focused on science 
and research, but now they were competing internationally. McKinsey wanted to 
create a “big-win” mentality. McKinsey and Nycomed started collaborating, 
focusing on phase two -- “Building an excellent company” -- which more or less 
was a continuation of the work done during 1983-84. The project objective was to 
implement the results from “Project Escalation” successfully, and develop a new 
corporate culture in Nycomed.  
 
McKinsey had developed a tool named “McKinsey’s 7S Framework”, mentioned 
earlier in the theory section, for analyzing the corporate culture. Robert H. 
Waterman Jr. and Tom Peters developed the model displayed in the book “In 
Search of Excellence”. The model was designed as a tool for assessing the internal 
structure and situation of a corporation.  
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
42Personal Interview with Odd Kåre Strandli 10.01.2011 and with Stein Holst Annexstad 
24.05.2011 
43Personal Interview with Gert Wilhelm Munthe 13.01.2011 
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The following model has been collected from Wikipedia.org44, and McKenna’s 
Book.45  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the senior management seminar on organizational development McKinsey 
draws the following picture about Nycomed’s seven S.46 
- Structure: Nycomed is divisionalized from functional. The company has 3 
separate marketing and production organizations, but a central R&D 
department. Nycomed sales are organized into international sales 
subsidiaries and licensees.  
- Style: Nycomed had a tradition of tight budgetary controls, and operating 
decisions were usually pushed up. Hard decisions and unresolved issues 
were often avoided. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
44Wikipedia.org 2011. McKinsey 7S Framework.svg 
45McKenna. 2006 
46Senior Management Seminar on Organizational Development. June 20, 1984. 
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- Systems: Sales, costs, production etc. were recently changed toward 
product segments. Nycomed had limited financial and quantitative 
reporting, and restrictive senior management controls. 
- Staff: Most of the employees at Nycomed were “older” people with 
narrow technical backgrounds. Nycomed had very low turnover of 
employees, but was also poor at recognizing outstanding performers and 
poor at people development 
- Skills: Nycomed was at par with the best in the world in contrast media. 
They had an early exposure to internationalization, but had little sales and 
marketing driven skills. 
- Shared Values: Some of the employees were reluctant to change, and 
wanted to defend the status quo. There was little sense of urgency in the 
organization, as well as a lot of freedom without accountability. People 
down the line were not aware of what was expected of them. 
- Strategy: Nycomed had a new strategy, which meant that they were to 
strengthen contrast media, and make it the core of the business as well as 
to research to find new “legs” for the future. 
 
The old Nycomed had characteristics of being a slow organization, with little 
belief in the possibility of perhaps being a world leader in a given market. Some 
of the issues that McKinsey discovered was the lack of management skills that 
was imminent within the company. Then there was the perception that everyone 
had to agree on anything in order to make a decision. There was a need to acquire 
people with skills and efficiency in management. From the interviews done by 
McKinsey there can be found quotes like: “We are so slow it’s unbelievable” and 
“Leaders are afraid to knock heads”.47 McKinsey wanted to change the corporate 
culture in order to successfully implement the goals developed in the new 
strategy. The employees at Nycomed had to want to be big in contrasts.  
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
47Senior Management Seminar on Organizational Development. June 20, 1984. 
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3.8 The end of Building an Excellent Company 
Nycomed had already, as mentioned above, renegotiated their licensees, which 
was perhaps the most important strategic direction given. Stein H. Annexstad was 
the economist recruited to Nycomed to renew their approach to management. He 
was responsible for implementing the strategy developed along with McKinsey. 
When Annexstad started working at Nycomed he also recognized the scientific 
culture, and some resistance towards the thought about becoming a world leading 
company in contrast media. Employees were wondering why they should want to 
be big. One of the most important tasks related to implementation was thus 
changing the corporate culture, and getting the right people working on strategy. 
Annexstad said that the most positive thing McKinsey did was functioning as a 
catalyst for changing the company approach.48  
 
During the implementation of the strategy, McKinsey wanted to involve 
employees in Nycomed who might have leadership potential. They had tried to 
recruit managers from the outside but often failed due to the newcomers having 
issues with fitting into the culture. They found it more useful to find people inside 
who had potential, such as Odd K. Strandli. Annexstad recalls some resistance as 
mentioned earlier, but says that the attitude towards a worldwide approach 
changed after some time.49 The company had seen itself as a pharmaceutical firm, 
but it became a contrast media firm instead. Although the main focus was to be on 
contrasts, the company never lost sight of their diagnostics and pharmaceutical 
division.  
 
Odd K. Strandli and Stein H. Annexstad both feel that McKinsey contributed 
significantly in turning the company into a world leader in contrast media. Had it 
not been for their work, Nycomed would not be the story it is today48, 49. They had 
a world-leading product naturally, but it would not have been such a success for 
Nycomed. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
48Personal Interview with Stein Holst Annexstad 24.05.2011 
49Personal Interview with Odd Kåre Strandli 10.01.2011 
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3.9 Nycomed change after 1990 
The Norwegian energy company Hafslund bought Actinor in 1986 with the 
intention of acquiring Nycomed. There was a discussion about Nycomed going on 
the stock exchange by itself, or as part Hafslund, which already was present at the 
Oslo stock exchange. Annexstad debated this issue with the director of Hafslund, 
Svein Aaser, and they ended up launching Nycomed on the stock exchange 
through Hafslund as one conglomerate. Annexstad acknowledges making a 
mistake here.50 He wished they had launched the company separate from 
Hafslund. In 1991 Annexstad left Nycomed, and Gert W. Munthe, who had been 
working as a business developer for Hafslund, took his position as CEO of 
Nycomed Imaging.51 Annexstad recalls there being “a lot of chefs” during his 
time in Hafslund Nycomed. The focus on corporate strategy changed, and both 
Munthe and Annexstad felt that the strategy focus was on pleasing the stock 
market rather than developing the company further. The initial thought was that 
Hafslund was going to be a “cash cow” funding R&D and so forth at Nycomed. 
Instead it turned out that Nycomed was going to generate the highest cash flows 
of the two companies. In 1996 Hafslund-Nycomed was split back up into two 
separate parts, in order to focus on their quite separate business units. 
 
Nycomed had acquired Sterling Drug in 1994 and in 1997 Nycomed merged with 
the British pharmaceutical company Amersham.52 Finally in 2004, GE Healthcare 
acquired Amersham Nycomed.53 Before GE Healthcare acquired Amersham 
Nycomed the old divisions pharmaceutical and diagnostics had both been split up 
from the original company. GE Healthcare still has their contrast division and 
production located in Oslo and Lindesnes, Norway. Most of GE Healthcare’s 
work and research within contrasts still take place where it all began.  
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
50Personal Interview with Stein Holst Annexstad 24.05.2011 
51Personal Interview with Gert Wilhelm Munthe 13.01.2011 
52Personal Interview with Odd Kåre Strandli 10.01.2011 
53GE Health. 2010. GE Norway: Velkommen til GE Healthcare I Norge 
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Chapter 5: Analysis & Conclusion 
 
Nycomed has by far profited from their innovation “Omnipaque”, and by looking 
at the theory presented in Chapter 2, and the case in Chapter 4, it is possible to 
draw some probable assumptions as to why they were successful.  
 
Nycomed had a fairly tight appropriability regime by patent protecting 
Omnipaque, and they had basically developed a dominant design paradigm. The 
author believes, however, that much of their success was the ability to change 
strategic focus and culture.1  
 
When analyzing the case with regards to complementary assets, the author 
believes that McKinsey was a critical complementary asset during the 
commercialization of Omnipaque. McKinsey brought specialized knowledge on 
market analysis during the first phase, which led to the understanding of the 
potential success of Omnipaque. In the second phase they brought specialized 
knowledge about organizational culture and management, which prepared 
Nycomed for fully exploiting their potential. McKinsey had an apparatus that 
Nycomed could not create internally, but also an understanding of market and 
cultural analysis which would be impossible to construct while still being efficient 
in scientific drug development. In the McKinsey reports there is evidently some 
influence from Michael E. Porters “Competitive Strategy”, and the consulting 
firm contributes to an understanding, and to projections about a whole industry.  It 
may also be likely that Michael Porter was influenced by the consulting industry 
as his theories go toe-to-toe with the management consulting approach. McKinsey 
helps Nycomed achieve new goals and visions through a restructuring of the 
organization and the corporate culture, and the author believes that it would be 
difficult to create such an extensive process internally for Nycomed. The product 
Omnipaque would probably become a large success for Nycomed, but their 
competitors would likely buy the company if McKinsey had not been brought in. 
It is thus reasonable to assume that their benefits from innovation would have 
been significantly smaller than they became.  
 
-------------------------------------- 
1Teece, David. 1986 
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McKinsey also helped Nycomed in negotiations with their perhaps most important 
asset, the licensees. Nycomed did not have their own operations in Western 
Europe, USA, and Japan and was thus reliant on having other drug companies 
marketing and selling their drugs in the respective markets. They did have their 
own sales operations in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, but the largest markets 
were the Americas, Japan and Germany. Nycomed’s most important partners were 
Sterling, Schering and Daiichi, which licensed Omnipaque. During the 
commercialization of Omnipaque McKinsey helped Nycomed prepare and 
renegotiate the contracts with the respective companies, an event critical for the 
success of Omnipaque. Nycomed was, as mentioned, considering opening their 
own branch in the US, but got a lucrative contract with Sterling, eventually 
enabling them to buy the company years later.  With Schering, Nycomed 
encountered opportunistic behavior. Schering had licensed a certain quantum of 
Omnipaque, but were focusing on developing and marketing their own product 
instead. A situation commonly known as post-contractual opportunism, where the 
agent exploits its position after a contract is signed. Teece recognizes that the 
commercialization of a new drug, such as in the case of this thesis, is likely to 
require the use of specialized information channels.2 One might argue that 
Nycomed had a bi-lateral dependence on its licensees. Nycomed depended on the 
licensees to market and sell Omnipaque, and the licensees depended on Nycomed 
to grasp market share in their region, as well as collaborating on R&D. Nycomed 
had the opportunity to open their own branches, but the complexity and size of the 
overseas markets were so large that the cost of entering were outperformed by the 
cost of licensing. In the case with Schering, Nycomed developed competing 
products to Omnipaque and marketed them themselves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
2Teece, David J. 1986.  
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Conclusion 
Nycomed succeeded in the commercialization of Omnipaque, and the success 
became greater because of their collaboration with McKinsey. Omnipaque would 
have become a success story had McKinsey not been engaged with Nycomed, but 
the success would not likely benefit Nycomed to the same extent. Teece’s 
framework creates a framework for understanding how Nycomed succeeded, and 
if we look at the article, and probabilities presented by Mansfield and Wagner, it 
is possible to further explain how they succeeded.3  
 
By bringing in McKinsey they increased their probability for commercialization 
and economic success through the stake they put in contrast media, and 
transformation of the organization. McKinsey established an idea about the 
probability for economic success, and the strategic options they would have to 
take to achieve them.  
 
The answer to the research question is thus: Yes, McKinsey contributed directly to 
the success of Nycomed’s innovation “Omnipaque”. 
Implications for further research 
Because this thesis is limited to one case the author would like to promote further 
more detailed studies into the subject of commercialization and innovation. Is it 
possible to assume that bringing in an outside actor such as a management 
consulting firm always will enhance a company’s probability in succeeding with 
their innovations? I believe that further, and more thorough research is needed on 
the subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
3Mansfield, Edwin and Wagner, Emanuel. 1975 
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